Can LLMs Find Hidden Vulnerabilities in Nuclear Reactor AI Models
Six hand-crafted evaluation harnesses implement ground-truth physics solvers spanning nuclear engineering and applied mathematics:
An autonomous agent powered by Claude operates in a Reasoning + Acting loop, iteratively forming hypotheses about model weak spots, executing targeted probes through tool calls, and updating its strategy based on observed error signals.
The agent targets neural surrogate models of reactor systems, searching the input space for regions of high prediction error — inputs where the model's physics approximation breaks down and cannot be trusted for downstream inference or safety analysis.
A "successful attack" against a surrogate model is conventionally defined by a spike in prediction error, a purely statistical measure with no bearing on physical consequence. This goal reclassifies that failure in terms of real-world impact, requiring an attack to be a stealthy, plausible perturbation that pushes the system's true or predicted state past a safety-relevant limit.
Read the full definitionCan an LLM agent construct a successful adversarial attack against a surrogate model when given only black-box access to its inputs and outputs — with no visibility into model architecture, weights, or gradients?
Read the full writeupBeyond one-off adversarial examples, can an LLM derive a general formula or strategy that reliably and repeatably generates successful attacks — one that generalizes across simulators rather than exploiting a single model's quirks?
Read the full writeupAdversarial agent success rate across physics simulation harnesses. A "success" means the agent identified a high-error input region in the target surrogate model.
Notably, the agent reached this 100% success rate with no tools for running code or numerical simulations. It identified high-error regions in each surrogate model through the LLM's own reasoning about the underlying physics, not by executing a program to check its work.